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IS THERE LIFE AFTER ABANDONMENT?
THE KEY ROLE OF NEW YORK CITY'S IN REM
HOUSING IN ESTABLISHING AN
ENTITLEMENT TO DECENT,
AFFORDABLE HOUSING
ANDREV SCHERER*
INTRODUCTION

Heirs to a legacy produced by years of landlord neglect and abandonment, tenants in in rem housing' live in conditions that are among the worst in
New York City. The same legacy has made the South Bronx a symbol of
urban decay for the entire nation and has turned large portions of the urban
landscape into barren wasteland. More than 150,000 in rem tenants, mostly
low-income, are on the verge of homelessness. Only the plight of the homeless
themselves more dramatically reflects the magnitude of the current housing
crisis in New York City. While the private real estate sector at one time may
have been able to house (however inadequately) low- and moderate-income
New Yorkers, it is now clear that it will not and probably cannot continue to
do so.
In recent history, major reforms have been achieved through effective
political organizing and other forms of pressure which created the public perception that the housing situation was so intolerable as to offend basic notions
of human decency. At the turn of the century, expos6s of the horrible filth
and squalor in slum housing resulted in such reforms as a building code that
prohibited further construction of the airless, lightless, old law tenements. In
the 1930s, in the midst of general economic crisis and the reforms of the New
Deal, militant activism and other forms of political pressure resulted in the
construction of the nation's first public housing units. Public housing represented a quantum leap forward in the role of government from one of enforcer
of housing standards to that of provider of housing. Today, in the mid-eighties, we are again faced with an acute housing crisis that can and must be
* Coordinating Attorney in Housing Law at Community Action for Legal Services, New
York, New York. B.A., University of Pennsylvania, 1972; J.D., New York University, 1978.
I would like to thank the following people for helpful comments on drafts of this article
and assistance in finding information: Eleanor Bader, Lucy Billings, Hal Brodie, Jill Hamburg,
Peter Marcuse, Mark Pennington, Susan Reynolds, David Robinson, Claudia Slovinsky and
Morton Stark. I also gratefully acknowledge the fortitude and vision of the in rem tenants and
organizers who provided the inspiration for this article.
1. The phrase "in rem housing," used throughout this paper, refers to housing to which
the City of New York has taken title as a result of in rem tax foreclosure pursuant to New York,
N.Y., Administrative Code, tit. D, §§ D17-4.0 et seq. (1984). Likewise, tenants who live in
such housing will be referred to as "in rem tenants."
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addressed by major reforms. The leap we must now take is towards a new role

for government not only as the provider of housing, but also as the guarantor
of an entitlement to decent affordable housing.2

The thesis of this article is that in rem housing can play a key role in
establishing an entitlement to decent, affordable housing for everyone. In

rem housing consists of buildings that come into public hands as a result of
bankruptcy of the private real estate sector. A significant portion of New York
City's low-income population lives in in rem housing. These in rem tenants

have no option to move elsewhere. It is clear that the private sector will not, in
the foreseeable future, regain control over the bulk of the occupied in rem
housing stock, and that only a public sector solution will serve the needs of in
rem tenants and the homeless. The dimension of the in rem situation is forcing
the City to reevaluate its housing policy. Public recognition of the pressing
nature of the problem is also giving in rem tenants and their allies a foothold
in their effort to establish decent, affordable housing as an entitlement, with
government as the guarantor of that entitlement.
This article will explore the roots of the in rem phenomenon, describe and
critique New York City's in rem housing policy, and present a variety of advocacy goals and legal theories for the development of in rem buildings as a
permanent resource for low-income housing.3
I
BACKGROUND

Over the past two decades, the phenomenon of landlord abandonment in
New York City has accelerated sharply. In 1975, at its peak, abandonment
resulted in the loss of 40,000 dwelling units a year, a rate of over 3,000 units a
month.4 One study reported that between 1970 and 1983, New York City lost
over 310,000 units of low-income housing as a result of abandonment and
demolition.5 Because several households may be displaced when a single structure is abandoned, the number of households displaced exceeds the number of
2. For an in-depth discussion of the notion of an entitlement to decent, affordable housing,
and an elaboration of various arguments in favor of such an entitlement, see generally
America's Housing Crisis: What Is to Be Done? (C. Hartman ed. 1983).
3. Although the focus of this article is New York City, abandonment is an urban problem
that is hardly unique to New York. Nor is the extent of abandonment in New York proportionately as great as it is in some other cities. The unique aspect of New York's situation is the
City's fledgling effort to manage occupied buildings that have been abandoned by landlords.
The use of that stock as a solution to the problem of providing decent housing for low- and
moderate-income people can create a model for use by advocates in any urban area plagued by
abandonment.
4. H. DeRienzo & J. Allen, The New York City In Rem Housing Program: A Report 1
(New York Urban Coalition Jan. 1985).
5. Making Affordable Housing a Reality: Hearing before the Subcomm. on Hous. and
Community Dev. of the House Comm. on Banking, Finance and Urban Affairs, 98th Cong., 2d
Sess. 237 (1984) (testimony of Pratt Inst. Center for Community and Ent. Dev. and the Center
for Metropolitan Action at Queens College, CUNY) [hereinafter Hearing].
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units lost.

Although its pace may have slowed somewhat in recent years, abandonment continues to be a problem. Analysts have attributed the phenomenon to
causes ranging from rent control7 to the quest for "super profits."' 8 The sever-

ity of abandonment in New York City is at least partly due to the flight of
capital to the Sunbelt, the loss of working class jobs in the metropolitan area,9

and a failure of tenants' real income to keep pace with rent increases. 10
Whatever the cause, the significant fact for the purpose of this article is that
huge numbers of private landlords have simply walked away from their

properties and from their roles as providers of housing for low-income New
Yorkers.

A significant and growing portion of the population simply cannot pay
rents at the level necessary to yield profits for landlords. Many of New York
City's low-income tenants already pay more than they can afford; over 80% of
households with annual incomes below $12,500 spend more than 25% of their
income on rent." The low-income tenant population is growing. The proportion of the City's renter households receiving public assistance increased from
11% to 14.3% of the City's population between 1970 and 1984.12 Between
1977 and 1983, the percentage of households below the poverty level increased
from 22.5% to 27.1%.13 There is a very concrete limit on the ability of many

New York low-income tenants to pay rent. The almost 1 million recipients of
public assistance in New York City are restricted to their shelter grant allocations and whatever else they can squeeze out of their meager 1 4 remaining public assistance grant by depriving themselves and their children of other
6. See Marcuse, To Control Gentrification: Anti-displacement Zoning and Planning for
Stable Residential Districts, 13 N.Y.U. Rev. L. & Soc. Change 931 (1985).
7. See, e.g., Rent Control Forever (editorial), N.Y. Times, May 27, 1985, at A18,col. 1.
Klein, Our Children Need Housing, Real Estate Weekly, Sept. 3, 1984, at 11, col. 1; Morris, No
Justification for Rent Control (letter to the editor), N.Y.LJ., Aug. 23, 1984, at 2, col. 6.
8. See, e.g., P. Hawley, Housing in the Public Domain: The Only Solution 25-30 (Metropolitan Council on Housing 1978) and Homefront, Housing Abandonment in New York City
17-32 (1979).
9. Homefront, supra note 8, at 2, 43.
10. H. DeRienzo & J. Allen, supra note 4, at 1.
11. M. Stegman, Housing in New York: Study of A City-1984, at 146 (New York City
Department of Housing Preservation and Development Feb. 1985).
12. Id. at 63.
13. Id. at 61.
14. For a family of four, the current shelter grant is S270 per month. 18 N.Y.C.R.R.
§ 352.3 (1984). The shelter allowance for families of other sizes is:
Household Size: 1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8 or more
Shelter Grant$193
$227 $244 S270 $281 $308 S366 S383
(with heat)
The remaining grant covering other expenses for households on public assistance is:
Each
Additional
Household Size
1
2
3
4
5
6
Person
Monthly Grant:
$94
$150
$200
$258
S318
S368
+S50
18 N.Y.C.R.R. § 352.2 (1984).
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necessities. The New York City Housing Authority meets the needs of some
of these tenants by providing housing for over 500,000 people in 172,202
apartments. 15 But with a wait list of 170,000 families' 6 and a waiting period
of many years, public housing is merely part of the answer.
The remaining
7

forms of federal subsidies also fail to meet the need.1
Landlords in low-income neighborhoods have generally found it difficult
to make a profit if they charge affordable rents while paying the full cost of
running a building."8 These landlords generally make their profits by reneging
on their obligations to pay management costs such as operation and mainte-

nance, debt service, or real property taxes, while charging rents that are unrelated to the tenant's ability to pay. In low-income private housing, any sensible

relationship between rent charged and affordability is, for the most part,
purely coincidental.1 9 One study done in Boston in the early 1970s estimated

that nonpayment of various management costs could allow a landlord to increase profits from 15.4% to 76%.20
This trend of abandonment by the private sector has been followed by

massive public takeover of tax delinquent property. The notion of public landlordship is not new,2" nor is the conclusion that the private sector, if left to its

own resources, will not solve the problem of abandonment.22 As of 1976, the
City could not take over property until the landlord was three years in arrears.
Implementation of the City's vesting law in fact took far longer than the minimum three years.23 At that time, the City managed few occupied buildings. In
1976, however, the law was amended to allow the vesting of multiple dwell15. R. Metcalf, Fifty Years of Public Housing: The Achievement and the Challenge 1
(New York City Housing Authority Mar. 1984).
16. H. DeRienzo & J. Allen, supra note 4, at 40.
17. The largest of these programs, the Section 8 leased housing program (Section 8 of the
revised Housing Act of 1937, 42 U.S.C. § 1437f), also administered by the New York City
Housing Authority, provides benefits to approximately 100,000 people in 38,200 apartments in
New York City. R. Metcalf, supra note 15, at 1.
18. See A. Downs, Rental Housing in the 1980s, at 3 (The Brookings Institution 1983).
19. Low-income tenants in "undesirable" neighborhoods, however, are able to impose limited market-style pressure on landlords. Rents in inner-city neighborhoods, while often higher
than tenants can afford, may still not be as high as a landlord might theoretically be able to
charge under New York City's Rent Control and Rent and Rent Stabilization Laws, New York,
N.Y., Administrative Code, tit. Y, §§ Y51-1.0 et seq., and §§ YY51-1.0 et seq. (1984). This is
due to the simple reason that there is a rent level beyond which slum landlords would not be
able to keep tenants at all because poor people would find it impossible to pay the rents.
20. People Before Property 139-40 (The Community Research and Publications Group
1972). These figures do not refer to a particular building, but are "fairly typical" of the Boston
market at that time. Id. at 139; see also P. Hawley, supra note 8, at 26.
21. See New York City Hous. Auth. v. Muller, 270 N.Y. 333, 1 N.E.2d 153 (1936); cf F.
Engels, The Housing Question (2d ed. 4th printing 1975) (Engels, writing in 1872, argued that
the "housing question" could never be solved through pivate ownership).
22. New York City Hous. Auth., supra note 21, at 341-42, 1 N.E.2d at 155; see also Note,
Low Income Co-ops: A Solution to Abandonment, 17 N.Y.L.F. 149 (1971).
23. Reynolds, Neighborhoods Pay the Price of Slower Tax Foreclosures, City Limits, Jan.
1984, at 5.
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ings after one year (or four tax quarters) of arrears.2 4 This change was
designed to preserve the low-income housing stock and to encourage payment
of real property taxes.2 Soon after the enactment of the new vesting law, the

City's takeover of property for tax arrears rapidly accelerated. By September
of 1979 the City's inventory of in rem housing consisted of 4,092 occupied

residential buildings with 34,880 occupied units.26 The inventory grew to
38,677 occupied units in fiscal year 1983,27 and to 5,100 occupied buildings
with 48,000 occupied apartments in February 1985.28
The passage of the new vesting law and the expansion of the City's in rem
inventory prompted the realization that the management of in rem properties

was a housing function rather than a tax function. Local Law 3 of 197829
transferred responsibility for the management of occupied in rem properties
from the Department of General Services (then called the Department of Real
Estate (DRE)) to the newly created Department of Housing Preservation and
Development (HPD) (formerly the Housing Development Administration).

HPD assumed responsibility for the management of these City-owned residential properties on September 1, 1978.30 While the DRE's policy had been to

sell in rem properties to the highest bidder, HPD undertook an "interim management" approach designed to preserve and upgrade in rem buildings.3"
A.

The In Rein Housing Stock

By the time residential buildings are transferred to City ownership

through in rem tax foreclosures, they are among the most deteriorated hous-

ing stock in the City.3 2 The 1981 housing and vacancy study shows that in

rem housing is in much poorer condition than New York City's other rental
housing. Compared to other rental housing in the City, in rem housing is
24. New York, N.Y., Administrative Code tit. D, § D17-4.0 (1984), amended by Local
Law 45 of 1976; see also Sonmax, Inc. v. City of New York, 43 N.Y.2d 253, 372 N.E.2d 9, 401
N.Y.S.2d 173 (1977) (landlord unsuccessfully challenged the shorter vesting period on constitu-

tional grounds).
25. Dep't of Housing Preservation and Development of the City of New York, The In
Rem Housing Program, Third Annual Report 32 (1981). Another factor in the City's decision
to shorten the vesting period and accelerate foreclosures was the criticism of the City's accounting practices during the fiscal crisis. The debt ceiling for New York City's borrowing was based
on anticipated revenue which included uncollected and in fact uncollectable real property taxes.
The City exacerbated the crisis and increased its debt burden by borrowing against anticipated
revenue that would never be realized. See Homefront, supra note 8, at 66-68.
26. Dep't of Housing Preservation and Development of the City of New York, The In
Rem Housing Program, First Annual Report 13 (1979) [hereinafter In Rem Housing Program,
First Annual Report].
27. Dep't of Housing Preservation and Development of the City of New York, The In
Rem Housing Program, Fifth Annual Report 33, 34 (1983) [hereinafter In Rem Housing Program, Fifth Annual Report].
28. Failure of Plan for Homeless Reflects City Housing Crisis, N.Y. Times, Feb. 19, 1985,
at B5, col. 1.
29. New York, N.Y., Charter § 1802.8 (1984).
30. The In Rem Housing Program, First Annual Report, supra note 26, at 2.
31. Id. at ii.
32. Id. at 1.
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much more likely to be located in economically distressed neighborhoods.3 3
More often than private rental housing, in rem buildings are dilapidated, ro-

dent-infested, lacking in heat, and full of cracks and holes in the walls, ceilings,

and

floors.3 4

The

deterioration

which

inevitably

accompanies

abandonment and disinvestment is further exacerbated by the City's delay in
vesting vacant buildings.3 5
B. In Rem Tenants
On the whole, in rem tenants are people with the least resources and the

fewest options. They are people who suffer the greatest discrimination in our
society. They have a lower median family income than other tenants in New
37
York City. 36 More of them receive public assistance relative to all renters.

Most in rem tenant families who do receive public assistance pay a higher
portion of their income for rent than other renters.38 Eighty-four percent of in

rem tenants are minorities, while minorities comprise only 46.5% of the total
33. The In Rem Housing Program, Fifth Annual Report, supra note 27, at 5.
34. A chart comparing conditions in in rem housing with all rental housing in New York
follows:
CONDITION OF IN REM AND ALL RENTER HOUSING UNITS,
NEW YORK CITY, 1984
All renter (%)
In rem (%)
Housing Condition:
Dilapidated
3.4
16.5
Maintenance Deficiencies
1 or more
57.5
78.0
3 or more
20.5
49.0
Additional heating needed
26.5
41.5
Heat breakdown 4 or more times
12.3
29.1
Cracks in walls/ceilings
23.9
45.2
Holes in floors
10.8
32.0
Broken plaster
16.6
25.7
Rodents
28.9
58.7
U.S. Bureau of the Census, New York City Housing and Vacancy Surveys (1984) (cited in M.
Stegman, supra note 11, at 232).
35. In Rem Housing Program, First Annual Report, supra note 26, at 1.
36. "The 1983 median income of households who occupied in rem housing was $8,215,
two-thirds the median income for all renters." M. Stegman, supra note 11, at 233.
37. Thirty-seven percent of in rem tenants receive public assistance, compared to 14% of
all renters. Id. at 63, 265.
38. Id. at 235.
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renter population.39 In contrast to private rental households, a higher percentage of in rem households are headed by females with dependent chil-

dren.' In rem tenants receive less education than the average New Yorker.
The estimated City-wide high school dropout rate is 42%, while the dropout
rate for in rem tenants is 60%.41

In rem tenants are also distinguished by the fact that they have no place
else to go. Because of their poverty, their minority status, and the low vacancy

rate in New York City's rental housing, in rem tenants have virtually no alternatives for shelter. In 1984, New York City had an extremely low vacancy

rate of 2.04%.42 For low-income New Yorkers seeking decent housing, however, the vacancy rate is in reality less than zero. The need for decent, permanent shelter exceeds the supply.43 In rem tenants, in practical terms, are
trapped where they are.

C. The City's In Rein Program
HPD's management scheme for in rem housing operates on two separate
39.

SELECTED CHARACTERISTICS OF HOUSEHOLDS IN IN REM
RENTAL HOUSING AND ALL RENTAL UNITS,
NEW YORK CITY, 1984
Racial/Ethnic Origin
of Household Head
In rem (%)
All renters (%)
White
17.0
53.5
Black
50.6
24.4
Puerto Rican
25.6
13.0
Other
6.8
9.1
Household characteristics
Female headed
59.5
N.A.
Single person
27.6
38.6
Household with at least 1 child
45.3
28.0
U.S. Bureau of the Census, New York Housing and Vacancy Survey (1984) (cited in M.
Stegman, supra note 11, at 38, 233-35.)
40. M. Stegman, supra note 11, at 233. Presumably, Stegman's use of the term "female
headed" means that there is no male in the household.
41. H. DeRienzo & J. Allen, supra note 4, at 48.
42. M. Stegman, supra note 11, at 3.
43. The crisis in housing availability for low income New Yorkers and its consequent effect
on people's lives have been amply documented in a number of recent reports. See New York
State Department of Social Services, 1 Homeless in New York: A Report to the Governor and
the Legislature, at iii (Oct. 1984) [hereinafter Homeless in New York]. The total homeless
population of New York State is between 40,000 and 50,000 people. The need for newly-built or
substantially rehabilitated housing units throughout New York State is approximately 444,000.
2 Homeless in New York, supra, at 10; see also Office of the City Council President of New
York, Children and the Housing Crisis: From No Home to Foster Home 5 (Oct. 1984) [hereinafter Children and the Housing Crisis] (Twenty percent of families with children in foster care
are homeless); Citizens' Committee for Children of New York, 7,000 Homeless Children: The
Crisis Continues 12 (Oct. 1984) ("[Htomelessness has its root in the low income population's
inability to find affordable housing and the difficulty in holding onto and maintaining what
little housing they do have."); Coalition for the Homeless, Cruel Brinkmanship: Planning for
the Homeless - 1983, (Aug. 1982).
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tracks. HPD's Office of Property Management (OPM), which oversees the
entire in rem program, is divided into two main divisions: the Division of
Property Management (known as "Central Management") and the Division of
Alternative Management Programs (DAMP). Central Management is directly
responsible for managing the bulk of the in rem properties (75%)."
Central Management, as its name implies, is a centralized bureaucracy
that directly manages over 10,000 buildings from site offices in the Bronx,
Brooklyn and Manhattan. a"
DAMP, on the other hand, consists of several alternative programs
through which HPD contracts with third parties or the tenants themselves for
the management of in rem properties. DAMP was formed largely as a result of
community pressure. Since its inception in 1978, DAMP has undergone several changes and reorganizations. New programs have been developed; other
programs have been terminated. DAMP programs have involved contracts
with people and entities in three separate categories: tenants, not-for-profit
groups, and the private, for-profit real estate sector. The most innovative of
the DAMP programs is the Tenant Interim Lease Program (TILP), under
which HPD enters into leases with tenants' associations which then run their
own buildings. Other not-for-profit DAMP programs include a Community
Management Program (CMP), under which HPD contracts with neighborhood-based, not-for-profit groups to manage in rem buildings, and a 7-A Leasing Program, under which HPD contracts with court-appointed
administrators4 6 who had been overseeing the buildings at the time of foreclosure. In the category of for-profit management of in rem properties, DAMP
has a Private Ownership and Management Program (POMP) under which
HPD contracts with private real estate management firms to manage in rem
buildings.
All DAMP programs are intended ultimately to result in a sale of the
properties to private owners. In most programs the buildings are sold to the
DAMP managers. DAMP expects that the buildings in TILP, and some of
those in CMP, will be sold as tenant co-ops.47
As HPD's "sales track" program, DAMP has proportionately received
the lion's share of the public funding directed towards the in rem program. A
typical unit in DAMP receives an average of $3,300 in public funding,4 8 while
a typical unit in Central Management only receives an average of $511.43.49
44. H. DeRienzo & J. Allen, supra note 4, at 28.
45. Id. at 39.
46. These administrators are appointed under Article 7-A of the N.Y. Real Prop. Acts
§§ 769-782 (McKinney 1979), a special proceeding which requires a court to appoint an administrator upon a finding that the landlord has not remedied conditions dangerous to the life,
health or safety of the tenants. Id. at §§ 772-778. While the court appointment terminates upon
the City's tax foreclosure on the property, arrangements are made under the 7-A leasing program for the administrator to continue to manage the building.
47. H. DeRienzo & J. Allen, supra note 4, at 28.
48. Id. at 43.
49. DeRienzo and Allen estimate a net public expenditure of $17.9 million on the approxi-
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Because they are targeted for sale and return to the tax rolls, the buildings that
are selected for DAMP are in better condition than buildings in Central Management. Moreover, the tenants in the DAMP buildings are relatively better
off than their counterparts in Central Management. Twenty-five percent of the
tenants in DAMP rely on public assistance, as opposed to 50% of the tenants
in Central Management. °
The projected total public expenditure for Central Management in 1985 is
$112.6 million.5 1 Public funding for Central Management is split evenly between Community Development Block Grant money from the federal government and New York City tax dollars. 52 The fiscal year budget allocation for
DAMP is $33.39 million from a variety of sources.53
II
C=TY POLICY TOWARD IN REM HOUSING

-

A CRITIQUE

City policy toward in rem housing has been at best ambivalent. Vacillating between the competing goals of increasing real property tax revenues and
preserving low-income housing stock, City policy has tended to emphasize the
former at the expense of the latter. The City's articulated policy has been to
seek a return of in rem buildings to private ownership (and thereby to the tax
rolls) as soon as possible. 54 In rem management is ostensibly an interim situation which exists pending the prompt resale of tax foreclosed property." The
articulated goal, preserving the low-income housing stock, has not resulted in
adequate consideration of the long term needs of in rem tenants. Resources
have generally been allocated according to formulas designed to accomplish
the goal of building sales. The limited number of building sales and the worsening low-income housing situation, however, have had a sobering influence
on City policy. In spite of its long resistance, the City has at least begun to
consider both the cost of improvement of in rem housing conditions and long
term management of occupied in rem properties.5 6
From the intake of in rem property to its management and disposition,
City policy determinations generally work to frustrate the development of the
mately 35,000 occupied units in Central Management. Id. at 39, 42. This amounts to S511.43
per unit. Interestingly, TILP, the only DAMP program involving tenant self-management, gets
less public money per unit than any of the other DAMP programs except the 7-A leasing program. Id. at 32.
50. Id. at 39.
51. Id. at 42.
52. Id.
53. Id. at 31. This figure represents the total of all the specific allocations set out by
DeRienzo and Allen.
54. M. Stegman, supra note 11, at 227.
55. In Rem Housing Program, First Annual Report, supra note 26, at 1-2.
56. For example, the City recently estimated that it would cost S150 million to make mini-

mal rehabilitations in the in rem housing stock. A comprehensive rehabilitation program is
under consideration. H. DeRienzo & J. Allen, The New York City In Rem Housing Program,
A Report 54 (Urban Coalition Sept. 1984) (draft). The City's hardship policy regarding rent

increases provides another example. See text accompanying note 63 infra.
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in rem stock as a permanent resource for low-income tenants. In spite of the
statutory authorization allowing vesting after one year of tax arrears,5 7 vestings still come about as slowly as they did before 1976, when the statutory
vesting period was three years and actual vesting often did not take place for
seven years. 8 The City's failure to take action to assure prompt vesting resuits in an extended period of abandonment during which buildings become
far more deteriorated, underoccupied, and expensive to maintain.
Once it has achieved ownership of tax delinquent structures, the City has
concentrated public funds in the sales track DAMP buildings, to the detriment of the Central Management buildings, where the majority of in rem tenants live. Moreover, to make in rem buildings more attractive to private
owners, and to offset public expenses, the City has sought (although for the
most part, has not obtained) large rent increases from in rem tenants who
often were simply unable to afford them. 9 Other incentives the City has offered to purchasers of DAMP buildings have been assurances of tax exemptions in exchange for investments in the buildings, low interest loans and/or
mortgages to purchasers and rent subsidies for low-income tenants.
In spite of a concentrated effort to gear the in rem program towards sale,
the program has not effectuated the sale of many buildings. The City has sold
only 271 buildings since sales began in 1980.0 In fiscal year 1982, the City
sold only 112 buildings.61 In fiscal year 1983, it sold only 104 buildings out of
a stock of 10,000.62 The City's inability to sell occupied in rem buildings in
any sizeable quantity is a reflection of their lack of marketability. It has also
forced the City to face its role as a long-term manager of in rem properties and
to reevaluate its approach to the in rem stock. One reflection of this reevaluation is the City's decision to develop a hardship policy to protect certain tenants from unaffordable rent increases.63
The City's "consolidation" program is another component of its policy
regarding allocation of resources among in rem buildings. Essentially a
triage 4 operation, the consolidation program closes down buildings that the
City finds too burdensome to operate. Tenants are moved out of deteriorated
and underoccupied in rem buildings into other, theoretically more viable ones.
The vacated buildings are then permanently closed. As a rule, buildings va57. New York, N.Y., Administrative Code, tit. D, §§ D17-4.0. et seq. (1984); cf. New
York, N.Y., Charter and Administrative Code § 415(1) - 58(0), a July 1984 amendment that
allows the City to vest buildings individually as well as by an entire borough at a time.
58. H. DeRienzo & J. Allen, supra note 4, at 4.
59. See text accompanying note 83 infra.
60. In Rem Housing Program, Fifth Annual Report, supra note 27, at 37.
61. Id.
62. Id. at 27.
63. See text accompanying note 56 supra and notes 83-86 infra.
64. The concept of triage has its origins in the sorting of battle casualties into categories
that determined who would be saved and who would be allowed to die. Application of such a
policy to in rem housing is a particularly unfortunate approach. It is one thing to make drastic
sacrifices as a result of the exigencies of war and quite another thing to do so with regard to
critically needed housing in one of the richest countries in the world.
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cated in this manner are ultimately lost as available resources. Consolidation is
usually followed by vandalism, and ultimately, by demolition.
By fiscal year 1983, the consolidation program had resulted in the closing
of more than 1900 buildings and the displacement of more than 7200 households.6" While on the surface the notion of consolidation may appear reason-

able because it is an effort to streamline an unwieldy operation, in reality it
merely accelerates a day of reckoning by diminishing the low-income housing
stock. Ultimately, if people are to be decently housed, the existing supply of
low- and moderate-rent housing must be expanded. 6 The cost of building replacement low-income housing, estimated at approximately $70,000 per
unit,6 7 far exceeds the cost of rehabilitating the average unit in a consolidated

building.6" Moreover, the remaining life span of most of the in rem housing
stock will far exceed that of most newly constructed buildings. The bulk of the
in rem housing stock was constructed in the 1920s and 1930s.69 If well maintained, these solidly built buildings will last for years. Additionally, building
abandonment creates a "domino effect"; the existence of vacant buildings on a
given block justifies the closing of additional buildings by the City and can
lead to further abandonment of nearby buildings by private landlords. Thus,
consolidation contributes to neighborhood destruction and frustrates attempts
to resolve the housing crisis.
On the whole, the City's in rem housing policy has consisted of attempts
to apply patchwork, short term solutions to immense, long term problems.
The City has concentrated its resources in a relatively small portion of the in
rem stock with the intention of returning it to private ownership. This priority has resulted in tenant displacement and a reduction of the remainder of the
in rem stock. The City has neglected the needs of in rem tenants and the
homeless. There are up to 53,000 vacant in rem housing units that could be
used to provide additional low-income housing.7 0 Yet the City's efforts to
units in in rem buildings to house the homeless have been
repair vacant
minimal.71
65. In Rem Housing Program, Fifth Annual Report, supra note 27, at 40.
66. Hearing, supra note 5, at 7-8.
67. Interview with Roy Metcalf, Deputy Director of Public Information, New York City
Housing Authority (June 28, 1985); cf. Dep't of Housing and Urban Development, Prototype
Cost Determinations Issued Under the United States Housing Act of 1937, 4A Fed. Reg. 47,776

(1984), which limits the cost of a three bedroom public housing apartment in an elevator operated structure to $67,350.
68. Children and the Housing Crisis, supra note 43, at 16.

69. M. Stegman, The Dynamics of Rental Housing in New York City 22 (1982).
70. M. Stegman, supra note 11, at 227.
71. Children and the Housing Crisis, supra note 43, at 16. Ironically, in response to the

homelessness crisis, the City established an unwritten policy in 1983 to rent vacant units in in
rem buildings exclusively to the homeless. Yet, according to City Council President Bellamy,
while hundreds of millions of dollars have been spent on temporary shelter for the homeless,
relatively little has been spent to rehabilitate vacant in rem units. Id.
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III
ADVOCACY STRATEGIES FOR IN

REM HOUSING

A confluence of factors makes the time ripe for advocates to press the
public sector to assume accountability for in rem tenants. The daily newspapers are constantly filled with the issue of homelessness. A sense of urgency
pervades the media. Increasingly, the public is coming to realize that solutions
to the housing crisis must be found, and that these solutions must involve
permanent housing, not merely temporary shelter. There is a growing consensus that the solutions must come from the public sector, and that the housing
crisis is a social problem in which government has an essential role.7" Moreover, in increasing numbers, in rem tenants are organizing, taking a stand and
demanding that the City become accountable.7 3 These tenants realize that
they have no place to go. The very existence of an enormous stock of in rem
housing of which the City has no foreseeable means to divest itself demands
that the problem be addressed immediately.
A concentrated advocacy effort on the political, legislative, and legal
fronts can help shape City policy and assist in the establishment of in rem
housing as a permanent, affordable resource for low-income people. Advocates
have at their disposal a wide variety of tactics ranging from direct action on
the grass roots level to litigation designed to address issues in both an affirmative and a defensive manner. Advocates can also pursue legislative efforts on
the municipal, state, and federal levels. Pressure brought to bear on the City at
each stage of the in rem process-from the vesting of in rem buildings to their
management by the City to their ultimate disposition-can profoundly affect
the availability of housing in New York City.
A.

At the Intake Stage

At the very start of the process, the City must hasten the vesting of in rem
buildings in order to protect the low-income housing stock from the ravages of
abandonment. The City must vest buildings as soon as it has the authority to
do so-after one year of arrears, not after three to seven years.74 Moreover,
72. See, e.g., Klein, supra note 4, at 11, col. 1. (Klein, President of the N-7 Realty Owners
Association, argues for "funds through bonding which can be used to do massive rehabilitation
and renovation work . . . ."); see also United States Conference of Mayors, Housing Needs
and Conditions in America's Cities: A Survey of the Nation's Principal Cities 2 (June 1984)
(eighty-nine percent of the municipalities surveyed responded that the private sector could not
meet local housing needs absent housing subsidies).
73. One organization, the Union of City Tenants (UCT), is a grass roots union of tenants
who live in in rem housing. UCT is a growing union devoted to advocating the rights of in rein
tenants. Metropolitan Council on Housing, the largest and oldest New York City-wide tenant
organization, has also made the issue of in rem housing an important focus of its work, as has
the Association for Neighborhood and Housing Development (ANHD), an umbrella organization for community development groups that has taken leadership in policy analysis and advocacy regarding in rem issues.
74. Of additional use in the fight to halt abandonment is the City's recently acquired authority to vest individual buildings. See note 57 and accompanying text supra.
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the City must make housing code enforcement a priority, and undertake a

serious, comprehensive effort to compel landlords to maintain habitable
properties.75 Such an effort, it may be argued, is ill-advised because it will

drive marginal landlords out of business by forcing them to choose between
paying taxes or making repairs. This is, in fact, the rationale for a selective

approach to code enforcement on the part of HPD.76 Yet, if the City is ever to
make a serious commitment to guaranteeing decent housing, its policies will
inevitably have the effect of driving some marginal landlords out of business.
Ideally, this would happen in time to salvage deteriorating properties and preserve them as resources for low-income tenants.
B.

During City Management

Once these properties come under City ownership, advocacy efforts are

needed to achieve improvements in at least six different areas: quality, affordability, stability, tenant control, institutionalization, and budget.
1.

Quality

The City has a legal obligation, which all too often goes unheeded, to
keep its in rem properties in good repair. 77 To its credit, the City has made
progress in improving its abysmal performance in providing services and re-

pairs.7 8 In 1980, for example, the median time required for -IPD to restore
heat to a building was 14 days. By 1983 it was 2.4 days.7 9 Yet in rem tenants,

and advocates working with them, must continue to insist that their housing
be made truly liveable8 0
75. One way to aid in effective code enforcement would be to bar landlords from instituting eviction proceedings if they have any outstanding code violations.
76. HPD's Division of Code Enforcement is charged with the responsibility of enforcing
the housing maintenance code. New York, N.Y., Charter § 1802.1 (Supp. 1984-1985).
77. See N.Y. Real Prop. Law § 235-b (McKinney 1984); see also City of New York v.
Rodriguez, 117 Misc. 2d 986, 461 N.Y.S.2d 149 (1983). The city's obligation under RPL
§ 235-b to warrant the habitability of in rem housing was recently reaffirmed in Dep't of Hous.
Preservation and Dev. of New York v. Sartor, N.Y.L-., March 25, 1985, at 6, col. 3 (N.Y. App.
Div. 1985), in which the Court held: "It is clear from the unequivocal language of the statute,
and the broad application of its protective mantle by the cases which have applied it, that 235-b
excludes no residential tenant and includes all persons and entities as 'landlords."' Id. The
Sartor court rejected the argument articulated in a recent commentary on Rodriguez that the
warranty of habitability does not apply to in rem housing. See, Comment, The Warranty of
Habitability as Applied to New York City In Rem Housing: A Premature Promise, 50 Brooklyn L. Rev. 1103 (1984). As the Sartor court pointed out, "[w]hile superficially appealing, this
position discriminates basically against lower-income tenants. It would, in effect, force these
tenants not only to subsidize the cost of their housing (which appears fair) but also to pay for
housing which they are not receiving." N.Y.L.J., March 25, 1985, at 6, col 2.
The Sartor court's rejection of this argument is a significant condemnation of the callous
disregard for the needs of in rem tenants that has all too frequently prevailed among those with
decision-making power.
78. In Rem Housing Program: Fifth Annual Report, supra note 27, at 23-24
79. Id. at 24.
80. For a discussion of the condition of in rem housing as compared to other rental housing, see text accompanying note 34 supra.
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2. Affordability
In rem buildings must be kept affordable, and where necessary, made affordable for in rem tenants. s1 The City concedes that in rem housing is in fact
the last resort for much of its low-income tenant population.82 To charge in
rem tenants unaffordable rents is to relegate them to the streets, an option the
City cannot be allowed to take. Vigorous advocacy has produced progress in
this area as well-most notably the "hardship" policy for tenants in Central
Management that allows them to pay no more than 30% of their income for
rent.8 3 This restriction applies across the board for Central Management tenants because the City does not attempt to sell Central Mangagement buildings.
There is also a hardship provision for certain tenants in DAMP buildings.8 4
The protected categories are: 1) tenants who are eligible for rent subsidies
under the federal government Section 8 program,8 5 and 2) tenants who are
senior citizens who would be eligible for a rent increase exemption under the
City's Senior Citizen Rent Increase Exemption (SCRIE) program if they did
not live in a City-owned building. 6 DAMP tenants are not given across-theboard protection from unaffordable rents because rents are set in order to assure that these buildings, which are slated to become privately owned, produce
an income flow large enough to make them economically self-sufficient."' The
condition of the buildings is thus given priority over the tenants' needs for
affordable rents and their ability to remain in their homes regardless of their
income.
81. City owned buildings are exempt from New York City's Rent Control and Rent Stabilization Laws. New York, N.Y., Administrative Code, tit. Y, §§ Y51 - 3.0 (e)(2)(f), and YY513.0(a)(1)(9) (1984).
82. In Rem Housing Program, First Annual Report, supra note 26, at 1.
83. At present, the only place this policy can be found in writing is in affidavits submitted
by HPD during litigation. See Laureano v. Koch, 116 Misc. 2d 287, 254 N.Y.S.2d 956 (Sup. Ct.
1982), modified, 100 A.D.2d 192, 473 N.Y.S.2d 445 (1st Dep't 1984), rev'd, N.Y.L.J., Apr. 1,
1985, at 4, col. 1, amended; N.Y.L.J., June 6, 1985, at 5, col 3 (N.Y. 1985). Paragraph 12 of the
affidavit of William Terry Krueger provides that:
If the rent established at title vesting creates a financial hardship and is beyond
what the tenant can demonstrate that he can pay, then central management [sic] will
rollback the rent to an affordable level upon the submission of proper income verification. Welfare recipients will not be required to pay over the maximum rental level
established by the Department of Social Services and tenants on fixed incomes are
eligible for rent reduction so that their rents do not exceed 25-33% of their income.
Further, central management [sic] will honor any existing subsidy or exemption, e.g.,
senior citizen rent increase exemption. The burden is on the tenant, however, to produce the proper documentation indicating eligibility for a rent reduction.
84. HPD Rules and Regulations for Rent Setting and Rent Increases to tenants in occupancy in Division of Alternative Management Program Building, § 7 of which sets forth a hardship policy for tenants in DAMP buildings.
85. See note 17 supra.
86. New York, N.Y., Administrative Code, tit. Y, §§ Y51-5.0, YY51.-4.1.1, and YYY511.0-14.0 (1984).
87. Upon return to private ownership, dwelling units that had been rent controlled or
rent stabilized prior to in rem foreclosure become "subject to [the] rent stabilization law. . at
the last rent charged by the city on behalf of the city." New York City Administrative Code,
tit. Y, § YY51-3.3a (1984).
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3. Stability
The City must guarantee stability in the in rem program. Forced displacement, as a result of neglect, mismanagement, unaffordable rent increases, consolidation, or any other cause cannot be part of the City's
approach to in rem housing. The scarred and ravaged communities in which
in rem housing is concentrated must be given the opportunity and the resources to rebuild.
4. Tenant Control
Tenants in in rem housing must be given the opportunity to have some
meaningful control over the decisions which affect their shelter and their lives.
Tenants must be involved in decision making about every facet of in rem management, including who manages the building, what rent levels are set, how
fellow tenants are screened, and whether buildings are sold. Only with meaningful control will tenants remain committed to the preservation of their
buildings and their neighborhoods.
5. Institutionalization
A less concrete but equally important advocacy goal for in rem management is the institutionalization of the notion of in rem housing as a permanent
resource for low-income tenants. Advocates must insist that the in rem program be the vehicle by which the municipal government fulfills its obligation
to assure that low-income people have decent, affordable shelter. They must
establish that the in rem program is a viable, long term solution, not merely a
temporary interval before the return of housing stock to a private sector unable to provide low-income people with decent housing.
Here, as well, the City has made progress. It has promulgated regulations
formalizing the procedures for increasing rent in DAMP housing.88 These
regulations give tenants a means to prevent the City from taking wholly arbitrary action and lend consistency to the program. 9 Moreover, the City is contemplating a major investment in the upgrading of the in rem stock. 90 Such
improvements would alleviate in rem tenants' frustration and the overall sense
of imminent decay. They would also involve the City in a more meaningful,
long term commitment to in rem housing.
6. Budget
Underlying all of the above concerns is the need for more money to make
the in rem program succeed. Unless the City makes a financial commitment to
upgrade the occupied in rem housing stock, repair and rent vacant apart88. See HPD regulations, supra note 84.
89. The regulations require advance notice of proposed increases, including a detailed
budget. This enables tenants to evaluate whether the costs alleged are accurately calculated and
necessary. Hardship provisions protect some tenants from unaffordable rent increases.
90. See note 17 supra.
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ments, and keep rents affordable to low-income tenants, in rem tenants are
destined to join the legions of the homeless. Advocates must, therefore, seek
and support measures to increase allocations for the in rem program.
C. At Disposition
At disposition, the last stage of the City's involvement in in rem housing,
there are two important tasks for advocates-fighting the closing of buildings,
and fighting the sale of in rem buildings to the for-profit sector. Under the
"consolidation" program, the City closes buildings in an arbitrary, standardless manner with no community input. Only when building conditions pose a
real danger to the lives, health, or safety of the tenants should tenants be required to move. Even under such circumstances, repairs should be made immediately and displaced tenants should be given a right to return. Only under
the most exceptional circumstances-where basic structural defects are so extensive that the cost of repairs approaches the cost of replacement-should a
building be permanently closed. Displaced tenants must then be guaranteed
permanent, decent, affordable shelter within the same community.
The disposition of in rem buildings through sale to the private, for-profit
sector must also be resisted. It is a given that public funds (in the form of
public assistance shelter grants and/or other public subsidies such as those
under the Section 8 program 91 are necessary to support a building that houses
low-income tenants. Because a private owner must pay debt service, property
taxes, operation and maintenance costs, and still show a profit, the cost of
supporting a private owner far exceeds the cost of operating a building under
public ownership. 92 Such private subsidies could save only a limited number of
in rem buildings, and represent a misallocation of limited resources.
In sum, advocacy efforts must address a wide range of problems in each
phase of the City's in rem program if the program is to become a viable resource for low-income housing. Able organizers, housing theoreticians, and in
rem tenants themselves are spending a considerable amount of time and energy developing political and legislative strategies to address the issues set
forth above. Lawyers and legal workers can play an important role in developing legal theories to be used offensively and defensively to establish and
protect the rights of in rem tenants, and to make in rem housing a permanent,
affordable, and viable resource. A description of several possible theories
follows.
IV
LEGAL THEORIES IN SUPPORT OF IN REM TENANTS

At present, there is a very limited body of case law addressing the rights
of in rem tenants.9 3 Yet a number of legal arguments in a variety of contexts
91. H. DeRienzo & J. Allen, supra note 4, at 43.
92. See America's Housing Crisis: What is to be Done?, supra note 2, at 4.
93. See notes 94-115 and accompanying text infra.
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are available to support the substantive and procedural rights of in rem
tenants.
A.

Due Process

Perhaps as a reflection of the societal disadvantages of in rem tenants,
perhaps as a result of confusion within BPD, policies and standards regarding
in rem housing have been developed and changed on an ad hoe basis. In rem
policies are formulated with no public input. Tenants are evicted, buildings
are closed, and rent increases are effected in the total absence of written guidelines, ascertainable standards, or standardized procedures. These actions have
the force of law. Yet case law exists for the proposition that when the government acts as landlord, it may not act arbitrarily. In Fuller v. Urstadt,94 the
New York Court of Appeals held that tenants who had the state as their landlord were "entitled to the same treatment as other individuals who [were] the
that the state had
direct subjects of state action, namely, the assurance.
'"
or
capriciously."
acted
arbitrarily
not
Federal level court decisions also support the notion that due process requirements circumscribe the actions of a governmental body acting in the capacity of landlord. Justice Douglas, concurring in Thorpe v. Housing
Authority of the City of Durham,96 summarized the case law as follows:
Over and over again we have stressed that "the nature and the
theory of our institutions or government, the principles upon which
do not mean to leave room for the
they are supposed to rest.
play and action of purely personal and arbitrary power" and that the
essence of due process is the "protection of the individual against
arbitrary action." Any suggestion to the contrary "resembles the
philosophy of feudal tenure." It is not dispositive to maintain that a
private landlord might terminate a lease at his pleasure. For this is
government we are dealing with, and the actions of government are
circumscribed by the Bill of Rights and the Fourteenth
97
Amendment.
Even the supposedly transitory nature of the City's ownership does not
relieve the City of its due process obligations to in rem tenants. 9 When the
94. 28 N.Y.2d 315, 321 N.Y.S.2d 601 (1971).
95. Id. at 318, 321 N.Y.S.2d at 603; see also Vinson v. Greenburgh Hous. Auth., 29
A.D.2d 338, 341, 288 N.Y.S.2d 159, 163 (2d Dep't 1968), afi'd 27 N.Y.2d 675, 314 N.Y.S.2d 1

(1970) ("Once a State embarks into the area of housing as a function of government, necessarily
that function, like other governmental functions, is subject to the constitutional commands
.. .The government as landlord is still the Government. It must not act arbitrarily, for,
unlike private landlords, it is subject to the requirements of due process of law.")
96. 386 U.S. 670 (1967).
97. Id. at 678 (citations omitted).
98. Johnson v. White Plains Urban Renewal Agency, 65 Misc. 2d 293, 294, 317 N.Y.S.2d
899, 900-01 (Sup. Ct. 1971).
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City acts in its governmental capacity in the housing area, it is subject to constitutional requirements.
To avoid acting arbitrarily, the City as landlord must comply with two
basic requirements. First, ascertainable standards must govern the relationship
between the City and its tenants. 99 Second, procedures must be established for
determining whether the standards are being appropriately applied." ° The
City has consistently violated both of these requirements by failing to develop
and implement ascertainable standards in virtually all aspects of its in rem

operation. The only exceptions are the procedures governing rent increases
for tenants in DAMP buildings that resulted from litigation and advocacy on
the part of in rem tenants. 10 1 Pressure on the City to provide in rem tenants

with adequate due process in appropriate contexts has not only the practical
value of establishing a more rational and reasonable program, but also the
added value of forcing the City to treat in rem tenants with a modicum of
respect in spite of their generally disadvantaged status.
B.

New York City Charter

Another potentially useful legal tool in compelling the City to establish
ascertainable standards is section 1105 of the New York City Charter. Section
1105-b requires all rules and regulations of City agencies to be promulgated in
accordance with its notice and comment provisions.' 0 2 The City cannot defend its program by claiming that it has standards unless it meets these
requirements.

Although the New York City Charter contains no definition of the word

"rule," cases and statutes at both the state and federal level have interpreted

this term. In a landmark case, the New York State Court of Appeals defined
"rule" as "any kind of legislative or quasi-legislative norm or procedure which

99. See Holmes v. New York City Hous. Auth., 398 F.2d 262, 265 (2d Cir. 1968), Williams v. White Plains Hous. Auth., 62 Misc. 2d 613, 617, 309 N.Y.S.2d 454, 459 (Sup. Ct.
1970).
100. See Escalera v. New York City Hous. Auth., 425 F.2d 853, 861 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 853 (1970); Fuller,28 N.Y.2d at 318, 321 N.Y.S.2d at 603; Johnson, 65 Misc. 2d
at 295, 317 N.Y.S.2d at 901-02; Williams, 65 Misc. 2d at 617, 309 N.Y.S.2d at 459.
101. See Laureano, 116 Misc. 2d 287, 254 N.Y.S.2d 956 (Sup. Ct. 1982), modified, 100
A.D.2d 192, 473 N.Y.S.2d 445 (1st Dep't 1984), rev'd, N.Y.L.J., Apr. 1, 1985, at 4, col. 1,
amended, N.Y.L.J., June 6, 1985, at 5, col. 3 (N.Y. 1985).
102. New York, N.Y., Charter § 1105-b (Supp. 1984-1985) provides that:
No rule or regulation of an officer of the city or of a city agency, including but not
limited to those with respect to the fixing of charges or penalties, nor an amendment
or addition thereto, shall be adopted or repealed pursuant to any provision of this
charter, unless, prior thereto, there shall be afforded by such officer or agency an opportunity for interested persons to comment in writing thereon by a date certain to be
specified in a notice published at least twice in the City Record, the first publication
being not more than ten or less than five days preceeding the date so specified. The
notice shall set forth the text and an explanation of the rule, regulation, amendment or
addition and the authority pursuant to which it is proposed to be adopted or repealed.
Such publication in the City Record shall constitute complete legal notice.
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establishes a pattern or course of conduct for the future." 10 3 Many City ac-

tions involving the management of in rem properties fall under this definition,
including decisions as to assignment of particular programs, rent setting, and
standards for eviction and consolidation." °
In the rent context, the City's obligation to publish the standards by
which it sets rents has been acknowledged. The Court of Appeals recently
reversed a decision of the New York State Supreme Court, Appellate Divison,
First Department, which held without explanation that rent setting procedures need not be published according to section 1105.105 In its reversal, the
Court of Appeals held that the publication issue was moot because the City
had published regulations."0 6 Although the Court of Appeals has not addressed the merits of the section 1105 argument, section 1105-b can be a useful tool for advocates in eviction and consolidation, as well as rent increase
contexts.
The City Charter's mandate that rules or regulations be promulgated
does not guarantee that the substance of those rules sufficiently protects in rem
tenants. However, by giving in rem tenants and advocates working on their
behalf an opportunity to have input into the substance of the rules, the promulgation process at least provides a vehicle to influence City policy. Moreover, the existence of established, written rules in itself can have a stabilizing
effect on the administration of the in rem program.
C. Uniform Land Use and Review Procedures
Ideally, decisions as to disposition of City-owned property should be subjected to the provisions of the City's Uniform Land Use and Review Procedure (ULURP). 10 7 This process requires review by the local community
planning board in the community where the building is located, and an application to the City Planning Commission. Disposition by sale is currently subjected to this procedure. Disposition by "consolidation," or closing up of an
in rem building is not. Failure to observe this procedure at the consolidation
stage is arguably a violation of ULURP. More than a mere technical obstacle
to place in the City's path, ULURP provides the only mechanism for involving communities in basic decisions affecting their future. Because of its de103. People v. Cull, 10 N.Y.2d 123, 126, 176 N.E.2d 495,497,218 N.Y.S.2d 38,40 (1961);
cf. Administrative Procedure Act (APA), 5 U.S.C. § 551(4) (1982); N.Y.A.P.A. § 102.2 (McKinney 1984).

104. Cf. Dubendorf v. New York State Educ. Dep't, 97 Misc. 2d 382, 394-95, 412
N.Y.S.2d 260, 269 (Sup. Ct. 1978), modified on other grounds, 71 A.D.2d 837, 418 N.Y.S.2d

834 (App. Div. 1979) (procedures for setting tuition in the State University system held to be
rules); Yaretsky v. Blum, 456 F. Supp. 653, 656 (S.D.N.Y. 1979) (memoranda designed to assist
health facilities in determining patient placement held to be rules).
105. Laureano v. Koch, supra note 83.
106. Id.
107. New York, N.Y., Charter § 197-c (Supp. 1984-1985) and regulations promulgated
thereunder.
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structive effect on a neighborhood, consolidation should only occur after
adequate notice to and consultation with the community.
D. Article 17 of the New York State Constitution
Article 17 of the New York State Constitution10 8 provides another tool
for advocates striving to establish substantive rights to decent shelter and
guarantees against the displacement of in rem tenants. The State and its instrumentalities have an obligation under article 1, section 1 to provide for the
needy. Although courts cannot necessarily dictate the particular level of benefits to be provided,"° article 17 requires that, at a minimum, assistance for the
needy not be withdrawn or denied arbitrarily. In fact, the New York State
Court of Appeals has held that "Article XVII imposes upon the State an affirmative obligation to aid the needy."'1 1 In the context of in rem housing,
article 17 provides a useful foundation from which to argue against displacement. This is especially true in light of the City's acknowledgment that the
"in rem stock is the sole housing option for many poor families in New
1 11
York."
Advocacy must take place on still other fronts in order to establish and
protect the rights of in rem tenants. These include: holding the City to its
obligations under the Community Development Grant program' 12 to spend its
grant principally to benefit low-income persons; holding the City to its obligations under the State Environmental Quality Review Act' 1 3 to ascertain the
impact of in rem policies on the environment; asserting the constitutional right
of low-income, predominantly minority in rem tenants to equal protection of
the law; and holding the City to its obligation to warrant the habitability of in
rem buildings.1 14
The more successfully lawyers and legal workers can develop and articulate legal theories that support in rem tenants in their broader struggle for
survival, the sooner a real commitment to in rem housing as a viable long
term resource will be won.
CONCLUSION

Instead of the final stage in the demise of low-income housing, in rem
housing has the potential to be the foundation for a meaningful commitment
108. N.Y. Const. art. XVII.
109. See Bernstein v. Toia, 43 N.Y.2d 437, 373 N.E.2d 238, 402 N.Y.S.2d 342 (1977);
RAM v. Blum, 77 A.D.2d 278, 279, 432 N.Y.S.2d 892, 893 (App. Div. 1980).
110. Tucker v. Toia, 43 N.Y.2d 1,4. 371 N.E.2d 449, 452, 400 N.Y.2d 728, 731 (1977); see
also Lee v. Smith, 43 N.Y.2d 453, 460, 373 N.E.2d 247, 250, 402 N.Y.2d 351, 355 (1977).
111. City of New York, Housing Assistance Plan: Federal Fiscal Year 1983, at 2 (May
1983).
112. Housing and Community Development Act, U.S.C. §§ 5301 et seq. (1976) and regulations at 24 C.F.R. §§ 570, 301 et seq. (1985).
113. N.Y. Envtl. Conserv. Law §§ 8-0101 et. seq. (McKinney 1984).
114. N.Y. Real Prop. Law § 235-b (McKinney 1984).
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on the part of government to guarantee decent, affordable housing to all, regardless of income.
The private sector has walked away from the provision of low-income
housing. The numbers of poorly housed and homeless people are growing.
Yet, if we are to be a decent society, everyone in the society must be able to
have decent, affordable shelter. The intrinsic value of this principle is
apparent.
The in rem phenomenon in New York City represents an important stage
in the evolution of the government's role in assuring that everyone has decent
shelter. Government's historic role as enforcer of housing standards and, later,
as sometime provider of housing, is no longer adequate to the task. Government can and must make the quantum leap forward to accepting its role as the
guarantor of decent, affordable housing. Unquestionably, there are major obstacles to overcome. The first is theoretical: a significant portion of the public
and/or policymakers must accept the notion of meaningful public responsibility.' 15 The second is practical: an entitlement to decent housing regardless of
income will cost money. Resources must be reallocated to meet the housing
16
need. 1
These obstacles are not insurmountable; they do, however, require a reordering of governmental priorities. But governments are continually called
upon to reorder priorities in the face of compelling human need. Here, the
need is apparent and compelling, and the solution is an obvious extension of
government's historic role with regard to housing. In 1936, when the first
public housing project ever to be built in this country was challenged on constitutional grounds, the New York State Court of Appeals stated:
Whenever there arises, in the state, a condition of affairs holding a substantial menace to the public health, safety, or general welfare, it becomes the duty of the government to apply whatever power
is necessary and appropriate to check it ....
The menace of slums in New York City has been long recognized as serious enough to warrant public action. The Session Laws
115. This is certainly not unprecedented. For example, private unsubsidized rental housing
has virtually faded away in Great Britain and subsidized housing is expanding. A. Downs,
supra note 18, at 1.
116. For an analysis of available resources that could be applied to the development ofin
rem buildings as a permanent resource for low- and moderate-income housing, see Hearing,
supra note 5, at 260-62.
In addition, real property tax delinquency has dropped significantly since the inception of
the in rem management program under HPD in 1978. As a result of a lower delinquency rate,

tax revenues collected in fiscal year 1981-82 were an estimated S137 million over those collected
in 1975-76. See H. DeRienzo & J. Allen, supra note 4, at 23. This is money that can and should
be used for the in rem housing stock. DeRienzo and Allen estimate that an investment of S70
million per year of the City's capital budget over a period of five years could restore the existing
in rem stock to viability. Id. at 60-61. They add, "to put this amount [S350 million] in perspective, the city has budgeted $744 million for improvements to the City's parks over the same
period." Id. at 61.

Imaged with the Permission of N.Y.U. Review of Law and Social Change

REVIEW OF LAW & SOCIAL CHANGE

[V/ol. XIII:953

for nearly seventy years past are sprinkled with acts applying the
taxing power and the police power in attempts to cure or check it.
The slums still stand. The menace still exists ....
. . . Legislation merely restrictive in its nature has failed because the evil inheres not so much in this or that individual structure
as in the character of a whole neighborhood of dilapidated and unsanitary structures. To eliminate the inherent evil and to provide
housing facilities at low cost-the two things necessarily go together-require large scale operations which can be carried out only
where there is power to deal in invitum with the occassional greedy
owner seeking excessive profit by holding out. The cure is to be
wrought, not through the regulated ownership of the individual, but
through the ownership and operation by or under the direct control of
the public itself. Nor is there anything novel in that. The modem
city functions in the public interest as proprietor and operator of
many activities formerly and in some instances still carried on by
17
private enterprise.'
Perhaps the quantum leap that must be taken is merely unfinished
business.
117. New York City Hous. Auth. v. Muller, supra note 21, at 33940, 1 N.E.2d at 155
(1936) (emphasis added).
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